Throughout history, many philosophers have addressed the question of our knowledge of God. In recent centuries, more specific, sensitive, and radical questions have arisen that have challenged the common understanding of God, inevitably causing great disruption in the fields of philosophy and religion. Among these questions, there is a very essential one which concerns God and the problems of evil. This question highlights God's status as both omnibenevolent and omnipotent. The problem of evil can be represented very easily: if God is omnibenevolent, then he/she would have an uncompromising desire to help prevent evil, and if he/she is omnipotent, then he/she should have the ability to exterminate evil, but it is obvious that evil still exists in this world. In the following paragraphs, I will examine BC Johnson's essay "God and the Problem of Evil" to examine God's next argument. Johnson's argument states that an ideal being with supreme grace and unstoppable power cannot exist in our world of evil. He states the problem at the beginning of his essay, informing his readers of the main purpose of his essay, grabbing their attention, almost making the reader sympathize with the baby. Johnson's analogy is: "a house catches fire and a six-month-old baby is painfully burned alive." He wonders how anyone can believe that God is "good" even though he has the ability to save an innocent child and chose to let him die. To justify such behavior, someone must provide indisputable proof or explanation for such an act. Johnson reiterates in his essay a list of excuses that ordinary theists would likely give in defense of God's behavior. He examines each of the excuses and...... middle of paper ...... his position on the issue. He concludes that there is not even the slightest possibility that God could be both all-powerful and all-good. This leaves us with three possibilities, as Johnson lists near the end of his essay: (a) that God is more likely to be entirely evil than to be entirely good, (b) that God is less likely to be entirely bad than him. Is to be all good, or (c) that the probability for each is the same that God is equally likely to be all bad as he is all good. One can easily conclude that case (b) is invalid, since God can be justified as evil through Johnson's essay and the discussion of theists mentioned above. Since case (b) is false, this leaves us with cases (a) and (c), the only other possibilities, which take into account the likelihood or probability that God is not so good, so the problem of evil triumphs over the traditional. theism.