The problem of moral motivation is one that, as Scanlon correctly identifies, any competent moral theory must recognize. Although chapter 4 of Scanlon's What We Owe to Each to Other, "Wrongness and Reasons," is commendable in its thorough and subtle examination of why we should have a satisfactory reason to be morally good, there are elements of this article that I find difficult to swallow, no matter how tenaciously I ruminate; in particular, Scanlon unsatisfactorily addresses the problem of the amoralist within his framework. I think this is due to an incorrect characterization of those who morality leaves "cold" and therefore Scanlon's conclusions regarding the amoralist position are therefore incorrect. This essay hopes to provide a more phenomenologically accurate description of the psychological and sociological imprint of the amoralist. Although it is usual to begin an essay like this with an account of what I interpret the term "morality" to mean, let me begin with an exposition of some archetypal conceptions of the amoralist that are floating around or are derived from literature, for I hope that, pending an appeal to my position, my formulation of morality will appear much less like the creation of a feverish current. imagination and, moreover, something that could be considered tenable. At first glance, it seems that there are two possible types of amoral character: what I will call the amoral skeptic and the amoral extremist. The skeptic admits that morality exists and that it can constitute a set of obligations for other agents, but believes that morality does not provide a good enough reason (if any) for fulfilling one's own "obligations." ". It is...... middle of paper ......e, a deep and comprehensive appreciation of morality. This constitutes an aspect of the deontological nature of morality; its other deontological aspects can be highlighted (and its previous aspects reinforced) by considering the way in which I interpret the learning of morality: indeed, through a primitive Wittgensteinian language game; what I would call a morality play. The original language game, in its basic form, goes like this: “The language is intended to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A builds with building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B must pass the stones, and this in the order in which A needs them. To do this, they use language made up of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “beam”. A calls them;---B brings the stone he learned to bring to this or that call.'