Berle and Means (1932), corporatization reforms result in the transformation of the control rights of individual managers into professional managers. The separation of ownership and control is the cause of agency problems, namely conflicts of interest between different parties. Furthermore, according to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), it can be stated more generally that the essence of the agency problem comes from the separation of management and finance. Funds raised from investors can be used to invest in further production or to withdraw assets from companies. Sometimes, due to lack or insufficiency of funds and resources of owners, managers require additional funds from investors to support investment opportunities or meet financial obligations of companies. As a result, investors have high expectations from the management team to manage the businesses better and thus generate a return on investment. The agency problem has become a major concern among listed companies and the Chinese stock market. They are constantly looking for incentive mechanisms in corporate governance that can help align the different interests between owners and managers, as well as control mechanisms that can provide preventive measures or guarantees that funds and corporate resources will not be expropriated or