Is knowledge relative because epistemic intuitions vary? In an article entitled Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions, Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (whom I will hereafter call WNS) proposed a challenge to the “normative project” (WNS 2001). :2) of epistemology, a project that involves taking an analytical perspective on epistemology and thus setting standards for how to pursue knowledge. As WNS points out, one of the knowledge formation processes on which this project is based is our "epistemic intuitions" (WNS 2001: 5), and it is from these intuitions that we can develop a normative vision of the 'epistemology. The problem, as WNS argues, is that if groups of people other than those who generally write about epistemology have different intuitions on these issues, this undermines the normative status of the epistemological view being defended. WNS goes on to argue that not only is this a possibility, but it is in fact a reality, supporting this claim with data from several experiments investigating the epistemic intuitions of people of different cultures or socioeconomic statuses (SES) different. From this and other evidence, it appears that there is indeed a difference in intuitions between Westerners and East Asians, whereby the former, they claim, are more "detached" and "analytical » with regard to situations, while the latter have a more “holistic” vision. view and are more focused on relationships in situations. If this is the case, then it seems that if each group's conception of knowledge is based on its own epistemic intuitions, we should say that knowledge differs between these two groups. And, of course, unless we are able to find an intuition-independent way to decide between them, we could not... middle of paper ...... use speed as a measure for the goal . goodness of a car. Yet whatever value concepts have within their societies, knowledge itself is not relative, but is fixed to our own intuitions and therefore criteria. That which meets somewhat different criteria should not be called knowledge, even though understanding may play a similar role. There should be no conflict between attributing something to knowledge and not knowledge, if one emphasizes that they are different concepts – which can be broken down by mutual agreement into more universal concepts. Bibliography: Weinberg, Nichols, Stich. 2001: Normativity and epistemic intuitions. Philosophical Topics, 29, 429-60.Sosa 2005: A defense of the use of intuitions in philosophy. In Mr. Bishop and Murphy, Stich and his critics. All page references are to the reading pack pages..