The book Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa sheds new light on the United States' decision , at the end of World War II, to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. Hasegawa argues that the decision to drop the atomic bombs was made in order to prevent the Soviet Union from making significant gains in the Pacific theater. So this was the first of many Cold War chess matches. In the first chapter of his book "Triangular Relations and the Pacific War" Hasegawa details American, Japanese, and Russian relations before World War II until shortly after the Yalta Conference. It summarizes Russo-Japanese relations from the founding of Vladivostok until the Russian defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, presenting the disturbing context of diplomatic relations before the founding of the Soviet Union. Hasegawa then details the aggressive actions taken by Japan in China and the Pacific during the 1930s, as well as the harsh stance taken by the United States against such actions compared to the Soviet strategy of appeasement. The Soviet Union's promise to join the Pacific War as well as the Manhattan Project and Japanese peace activists are discussed while Hasegawa details wartime relations. In chapter two “Stalin, Truman, and Hirohito Face New Challenges,” Hasegawa takes ample time to discuss the main challenges. political decisions at the end of the war. Starting with the planning for the American invasion of Japan which was to begin on November 1, 1945 and the enormous American losses on Okinawa which caused the planners to rethink the invasion. The key to this chapter, however, lies in the transition of power from Roosevelt to Truman. As Truman inherited wartime America, he had to make tough decisions... middle of paper...... Khalin, the Kuril Islands and parts of China before American troops can disembark. Stalin and Truman clashed on this point, but ultimately reached an agreement as long as the Yalta conditions were more or less respected. Hasegawa's argument attributing the Japanese capitulation to Soviet aggression is sometimes convincing. His book makes clear that the Japanese surrender cannot be entirely attributed to the atomic bombings, but neither can it be entirely attributed to Soviet aggression. The lack of a hasty Japanese surrender seems best attributed to the extreme internal partisanship and indecision of the Japanese leadership, even in the face of Soviet invasion and American aerial annihilation. Works Cited Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. Race against the enemy: Stalin, Truman and the surrender of Japan. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005.