IntroductionMain Body ~The doctrine of promissory estoppel was established with the intention of preventing injustice. This may arise in circumstances where Party A enters into an agreement with Party B under contractual legal rights. However, Party A may choose to renege on its original agreement and the other party will therefore seek to enforce its strict legal rights. The doctrine originated in Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Co. (1877). In the rental agreement, it was required that the tenant carry out the repairs upon given notice. The owner gave notice of repairs within six months. The tenants were initially looking to purchase its premises. The landlord then entered into negotiations with the tenants, during which he also agreed not to enforce the required obligations during the duration of the negotiations. Negotiations continued for two months, then failed. The landlord filed a lawsuit for failing to complete the repair tasks required in the lease. Consistently, the House of Lords held that “the tenants were entitled to equitable relief against forfeiture of the lease on the basis that the progress of the six month period had been suspended during negotiations”. However, the House of Lords refused to accept this argument, as "it was not supported by considerations, and therefore arguably inapplicable". This case has attracted the interest of people like Lord Denning, who is credited with inventing the doctrine of promissory and actually putting the doctrine into practice. The doctrine emerged in the case of Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd (1947). The claimant had rented a building in London, on a 99-year lease, at an annual rent of £2,500. During the 1940s, following the outbreak of war and the evacuation of London, they were...... middle of paper...... the doctrine to be removed is not expressed, however , there is a reference to terms using "limit" and "refine" which are meant to emphasize practical rather than legal advantage. Russell LJ views the doctrine through occasional techniques, where the courts may prevent giving effect to the parties' intention. It further adds that “consideration” is considered a “vitative factor” which is a prerequisite to a “valid and in force contract”. Russell LJ, does not distinguish the doctrine of the public interest but the form of it. On the other hand, Lord Goff also raises doubts, saying that the contract is widely considered to be deficient, due to the "presence of an unnecessary doctrine of consideration". Professor Dawson further argues that this suggests that the argument is based on the fact that the consideration "draws the net of applicability too narrowly »..’