Personal Experience of ScienceBorn as I was in the immediate post-war generation, my thinking about science in many ways parallels that of the generation in its together. We emerged in the aftermath of the first scientific war – fought between countries with, in many respects, highly developed technologies, which served to both fuel and end the conflict (Brehm, Kassin and Fein, 1999, cited in Schneider, Grunman). & Coutts, 2005). But then came the first idea that there was both more and less to science than shiny new machines, even killing machines. The social experiments of Milgram (1965) and the cold behaviorism of Skinner (Operant Conditioning, 2007) surfaced in popular consciousness and arguably fueled the lingering revulsion at the role played by science in the recent conflict. The increasing reach of television and the increasing immediacy of the worldview it provided may have contributed to a growing sense of a complexity beyond the immediate post-war world, to the sense that there had something more to obtain than the rational present. Such complexity has led to a desire for simpler solutions, smaller shelters and understandable solutions (Brehm et al., ibid). And this is where the long flight from rationalism, from theory to pragmatics, began (Omer and Dar, 1992, cited in Dar, Serlin and Omer, 1994), where personal experience and feelings took center stage. from the scene and the evidence took a backseat. My personal attitudes toward science in many ways echoed this process above, starting with wanting to be a rigorous scientist, but slowly drifting toward the humanities, while retaining some of my respect for the perceived qualities of hard science. I had first wanted to become a nuclear physicist, captivated as I was by the double influence of "How it works" and "Un...... middle of paper......souvenirs-de-ants --understand-the-human-mind-is-easy-once-you-realize-that-consciousness-is-a-thing-of-memory-and-consciousness-of- -soi-une-illusion-de-langage.html?full=trueMeehl., P. (1997) The problem is epistemology, not statistics: replace significance tests with confidence intervals and quantify. the accuracy of risky numerical predictions. In LL Harlow, SA Mulaik, & JH Steiger (Eds.), What if there were no significance tests? (pp. 393-425). Milgram, S. (1965). conceptualization of psychosomatic illness in children: family organization and family therapy. Archives of general psychiatry, 32(8), 1031-1038. Operant conditioning. (2007). . Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I_ctJqjlrHA