There are two main characterizations of interaction in the study of international politics, the first is cooperation and the second is negotiation. Cooperation is formally defined as “an interaction in which two or more actors adopt policies that improve the situation of at least one actor relative to the status quo without making the others worse off” (slide 23, Dr. B). Essentially a positive-sum interaction between the actors. On the other hand, negotiation results in a zero-sum interaction between actors. This means that any gain made by an individual actor is offset by a loss of equal magnitude on the part of the other actor. This is the main difference between the two main types of interactions in international politics, the resulting sum of costs and benefits for the actors. In cooperative interactions there is a net positive outcome and in negotiation interactions there is a zero-sum outcome in terms of costs and benefits. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”? Get the original essayDespite various reasons why states should cooperate, including the possibility of mutually beneficial outcomes, states often fail to cooperate. There are three significant obstacles to international policy cooperation. The first of these occurs when an individual actor is induced to shy away from cooperation. These types of interactions in which individual actors are incentivized to defect are called collaboration problems according to Frieden, Lake, and Schultz (FLS, 53). This barrier to cooperation is particularly evident in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Overall, it would be more beneficial for both parties to remain silent, but there is a strong incentive to “snitch” on the other side and grab all the spoils. The “real-world” example Frieden, Lake, and Schultz use to demonstrate this is the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Every country has a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons and continues to build them. Because of the collaboration problem, each state knew that the other had an incentive to cheat, thereby preventing any agreement to slow or stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The second obstacle to cooperation in international politics concerns the provision of public goods (FLS, 55). Frieden, Lake, and Schultz define public goods as “individually and socially desirable goods that are non-excludable and non-rival in consumption, such as national defense.” The problem of collective action, free riding, is of utmost importance in discussing why public goods can be an obstacle to cooperation. The reason collective action plays such an important role in hindering cooperation is that there is an incentive for free riding. The way individual actors perceive the situation is: why would anyone participate if they can reap the benefits without any effort? This reflection particularly applies to public goods and this is why they constitute a challenge in international cooperation policy. Frieden, Lake, and Schultz cite a particularly powerful example, the Second Gulf War. Obviously, many states have a vested interest in defeating a dictator and ending genocide, but as the United States has taken over operations, many have taken a back seat and allowed the United States to deploy its efforts. The third obstacle to cooperation ininternational politics is self-interest. An example mentioned in Robert Axelrod's article, The Evolution of Cooperation, concerns trade barriers (Axelrod, 7). Imagine that two countries both erect trade barriers. If the actors were not interested, they would remove these trade barriers because free trade would be beneficial to the other actor. The reality however is that both countries will likely maintain the trade barriers because, despite the benefits to the other actor, it would result in negative consequences for the nation by removing its trade barriers. Furthermore, maintaining the trade barrier once the other actor's trade barrier is removed is extremely beneficial. In this example, self-interest constitutes a crucial obstacle to cooperation. Despite a number of reasons why cooperation has the potential not to work, cooperation is by no means rare. Three circumstances in particular favor cooperation. The first of these situations is where the number of actors is reduced (FLS, 56). When there are fewer actors, it is easier to communicate and, as Frieden, Lake and Schultz say, "if necessary, monitor each other's behavior." In terms of public goods and the resulting collective action problem, smaller numbers are another possible aid to cooperation. This is a possible help in the sense that it is easier to identify free riders and it is much more likely that an actor who takes the burden of the public good will receive adequate compensation. Another circumstance conducive to cooperation in international politics is iteration, defined as “repeated interactions with the same partners” (FLS, 56-57). When actors work together over long periods of time, the likelihood of defection or free-riding is significantly reduced for a number of reasons. First, actors will understand that they are expected to work together in the future, thus avoiding defection or free-riding due to the potential benefits of future interactions. Second, actors are likely to take punitive measures against the other actor if the latter defects or behaves clandestinely. This punitive measure may consist of withholding gains from future cooperative measures, or even suspending cooperation altogether. This uses the concept of nexus defined as “the connection between cooperation on one issue and interactions on a second issue” (FLS, 57). The third situation in which cooperation is more likely is where information availability is high. This allows actors to check whether another actor has cooperated or defected. Additionally, high availability of information combats uncertainty and misperceptions. Examples of this can be seen in any election anywhere in the world. Individuals are less likely to cooperate and vote for a candidate if there is a lack of information about that candidate or, even worse, misinformation around that candidate. Another way to facilitate cooperation is through international institutions. International institutions facilitate cooperation in several ways. The first is to establish norms and standards of behavior (FLS, 63). This helps avoid any confusion or ambiguity when it comes to cooperation in international politics. These standards also help evaluate whether or not an actor has violated the agreement. The second way international institutions facilitate cooperation is through verification of compliance (FLS, 64). In conjunction with the rules and standards in force to determine compliance, international institutions.