In Texas v. Johnson (1989), Gregory Johnson burned an American flag as part of a political protest and was convicted under a law prohibiting the desecration of a revered object. The Court ruled in favor of Johnson, repeating that "if there is a fundamental principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government cannot prohibit the expression of an idea simply because the society finds the idea itself offensive or distasteful” (Brennan J. cited in Fraleigh and Tuman 285). Even though Johnson's expression was highly offensive to some, his speech must remain protected to ensure that other minority speech remains protected as well. When speech restrictions are created to prohibit hurtful minority speech, those restrictions will inevitably be used to prohibit valuable minority speech. The case of Collin v. Skokie (1978) illustrates this ideal well. Frank Collin, a neo-Nazi, wanted to organize a Nazi demonstration in the predominantly Jewish town of Skokie. Skokie residents sought an injunction against the protest, which went all the way to the Supreme Court, where the Court "'reluctantly'" concluded that it was Skokie residents' responsibility to "avoid the [swastika] "if their reaction was likely to be violent" (Strum 101). However, although freedom of expression was defended in the courts, when the time for the actual demonstration arrived, "several thousand counter-protesters [arrived]... Greeted by the spectators with a shower of eggs, beer cans, stones and epithets, the Nazis only stayed for ten or fifteen minutes” (Strum 143). The First Amendment functioned as intended in this situation: the speech, unpopular as it was, was upheld by the Court as priority, and a reasoned response to increased speech from opponents of Collin's speech provoked stopping the demonstration. Rather than stifling the speech