Why do nations obey international law? Although I'm not a native English speaker and you can infer that by reading the article, I should mainly state that the question has poor word choice, making it difficult for researchers who intend to answer the question to find a correct answer. Overall, there is a need to clarify what we are really trying to mean by using the word “nation”. There are several definitions of the word. John Salmond's definition is perhaps one of the most accepted definitions: "The closest definition we can get is to say that a nation is a group of people bound together by a common history, feelings and common traditions and, generally (although not always, as for example Belgium or Switzerland) by common heritage. On the other hand, a state is a society of men united under the same government. These two forms of society do not necessarily coincide. A single nation can be divided into several states, and conversely, a single state can comprise several nations or parts of nations. » Any research, unless supported by sufficient sociological data, will most likely lack an understanding of a nation's behavioral pattern. However, when looking at the articles, one can, or at least should, realize that they examine patterns of behavior of states or governments. Therefore, it will be more accurate to use the word “State”, “government” or another word that will more accurately describe the subject of the research. The second incorrect word choice is “obey.” Wittgenstein notes: “When I obey a rule, I do not choose to blindly obey the law. » As realists such as Thomas Hobbes, Henry Kissinger, George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau put it more accurately, nations do not obey the international...... middle of paper ......isa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry. 21 Journal of Legal Studies 115, 1992Barak D. Richman, Businesses, courts and the reputation mechanism: towards a positive theory of private orders, 104 Colum. L.Rev. 2328. P2340-2344, 2004Id.Eli Berman, Sect, Subsidy and Sacrifice: An Economist's Perspective on Ultra-Orthodox Jews, 115 QJ Econ. 905, p921-29, 2000Barak D. Richman, Companies, courts and the reputation mechanism: towards a positive theory of private order, 104 columns. L.Rev. 2328. P2346, 2004 George W. Downs and Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance and International Law, 31 J. Legal Stud. 95, p95, 2002Id.Eric Singer & Valerie Hudson, Conclusion: Political psychology/Foreign policy, The cognitive revolution and international relations, in Political psychology and foreign policy, p256