Table of contentsLegislative responseJudicial interpretationPositive actThe law has not always been this way. A generation ago, the traditional rule was that a liquor seller had legal immunity for harm caused by a drunken customer. The dominant theory considers that it is the client's voluntary consumption that directly causes the harm. (Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345 (1955).) The Legislature concurred with the authorities in refusing to enact a statute which would authorize civil liability in such circumstances. (See Cole, 45 Cal. 2d, p. 355.) But this rule did not last, at least in terms of the common law approach to the problem of drunk drivers. Say no to plagiarism. Get a custom essay on "Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned"? Get the original essay In 1971, the California Supreme Court rejected the traditional approach when it observed that "this rule is manifestly ill-founded and totally inconsistent with the principles of proximate cause.” established in other areas of negligence law. The court found that a duty of care was owed to the public when selling any alcoholic beverage to a clearly intoxicated person. (Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 165-66 (1971).) The Vesely case involved a bartender who served a "clearly intoxicated" customer who was later involved in a car accident. Five years after the Vesely decision, the state high court expanded the scope of potential liability by applying the Vesely rule in a case in which the alcohol was furnished out of state (in Nevada), but l The subsequent car accident occurred in California. (See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313 (1976).) In Bernhard, the court made clear that it was establishing a common law rule based on the ancient maxim enshrined in the Civil Code, namely that “[e]very person is liable… for an injury occasioned… by his lack of ordinary care…” (Bernhard, 16 Cal. 3d at 324; see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a).) But the court didn't stop there. ; it quickly extended liability to non-commercial "social hosts", stating that a person who gives alcohol to an obviously intoxicated guest at a party or gathering knowing that that person has the intending to drive a vehicle while intoxicated is not acting with reasonable care. (Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 153-155 (1978).) Legislative response However, the decisions in Vesely, Bernhard, and Coulter did not please the Legislature, which amended the law on general state negligence (Civil Code § 1714, cited above) to overturn judicial extension of liability. The amendment reinstated the previous rule – created by judicial analysis in cases such as Cole v. Rush, as already noted – that the supply of alcoholic beverages is not the proximate cause of the injuries resulting from intoxication. (See Civil Code § 1714(c).) Additionally, the Legislature amended the Business and Professions Code to include new language that restores immunity from civil liability for a commercial establishment that "sells, supplies, or gives" alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated person. which then causes harm to itself or third parties. (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 25602.1.) By its express terms, the new provision granted immunity to licensed suppliers of alcoholic beverages who supplied alcohol to obviously intoxicated adults, as well as to sober minors . However, it does not extend liability to purely social hosts. (See Cory v. Shierloh, 29 Cal. 3d 430, 440 (1981).) OthersRevisions to the code in 1986 expanded the law to include licensed sellers (and unlicensed sellers who are required by law to be licensed) who provide alcohol to an obviously intoxicated minor. But once again, the legislature chose not to include social hosts who simply provide alcohol. (See Ennabe v. Manosa, 58 Cal. 4th 697, p. 709.) Fast forward to 2011, when the Legislature again amended the state's general negligence statute (Cal. Civ. Code § 1714), this time to expressly authorize claims against a "parent, guardian, or other adult" who "knowingly furnishes alcoholic beverages at his or her residence" to a person whom the supplier knows, or should have known, is under the age of under 21 years of age and where the supply of alcohol is the proximate cause of subsequent injury or death. (See Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(d).) The state Supreme Court only ruled in 2014 that civil liability extends to social hosts who provide alcohol to obviously intoxicated minors when there is a positive “sell” of some kind. (See Ennabe, 58 Cal. 4th 697, 722.) A key question persists in this convoluted story: What constitutes “furnishing” alcohol so as to give rise to liability? Judicial Interpretation Last year, the California Supreme Court faced this same question. During a detailed opinion tracing the history of various statutory amendments and court decisions, the court noted that for social hosts, liability exists under Section 25602.1 if a person “sells” or “causes to be sold.” alcohol to a clearly intoxicated person. minor. (See Ennabe, 58 Cal. 4th, at pp. 709-710.) In other words, a social host can maintain immunity by simply refraining from charging guests for alcoholic beverages. (See Ennabe, 58 Cal. 4th, p. 722.) California appeals courts also hold that social organizers are not responsible for their failure to supervise people who drink alcohol at their events. One court noted that if the “failure to supervise” theory of liability was sufficient to circumvent social host immunity laws, “immunity would be seriously eroded.” The duty of supervision, the court said, “is based on the need to care for those whose coordination and judgment have been affected by alcohol consumption.” If permitted, this obligation appears to exist in most, if not most, cases where alcohol is provided by social hosts. (Allen v. Liberman, 227 Cal. App. 4th 46, 55-56 (2014).) The Allen court held that immunity applies, for example, if a person fails to lock the basement alcohol from a residence to prevent minors from having access to alcohol in the home. (Allen, 227 Cal. App. 4th at 56.) Affirmative Act As previously observed, the key to establishing the social liability of the host lies in the word provide and the parallel phrase causes the sale. Both seem to require at least some type of affirmative action. (See Ruiz v. Safeway, Inc., 209 Cal. App. 4th 1455, 1460 (2012); Sagadin v. Ripper, 175 Cal. App. 3d 1141, 1157 (1985).) Therefore, a person who has the control over alcohol and who orders or explicitly authorizes another person to sell it to a clearly intoxicated minor will be held responsible. However, if the person simply provides a venue in which alcoholic beverages are sold or provided by others (for example, the owner of a rented vacation property where a party is held), he or she incurs no liability. (See Allen, 227 Cal. App. 4th, p. 56; see also Leong v. San Francisco Parking, Inc., 235 Cal. App. 3d 827, 833-834 (1991).) As indicated in. 306, 318–25 (2014).)