Table of contentsDivine command theoryThe Euthyphro dilemmaAddressing an answer to the Euthyphro dilemma: God loves usWhat does God command? The Plurality ObjectionAddressing an Answer to the Plurality QuestionConclusionThe connection between religion and ethics is, and always has been, of the utmost importance, not only to theologians and philosophers, but also to human society as a whole , because it leads us to consider the role of religion in our society (Austin, 2006: 2). The above argument attempts to establish such a connection between religion and morality. This suggests that God's commands can make an action morally wrong (or right), and in this way the above argument is an example of divine command theory (DCT), which is roughly the view that morality depends in one way or another on God (Austin, 2006: 1). According to DCT, God explains why certain actions are morally right or wrong. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”? Get the original essay Having presented the DCT in its entirety, I will object to it by advancing what I believe to be its strongest objection: the Euthyphro Dilemma, which fundamentally attacks the way in which morality would be dependent on religion. I then consider and defuse a response to Euthyphro's dilemma, which considers the supposedly loving nature of God. If I were able to defend this objection, it could seriously undermine the DCT claim. Subsequently, I examine a second objection based on the issue of religious plurality, which attempts to undermine DCT by highlighting the vast differences and often direct contrasts between and within different religions, making it difficult to understand. objective use of DCT. I then attempt to defend this objection against a response. In presenting these two objections and disarming a response to each, my goal is to conclude that DCT is an inadequate conception of morality, and that morality is therefore in no way dependent on God. This would then allow me to assert that the argument given above fails. Divine Command Theory According to a divine command theorist, it is God who decrees what is good and what is evil (Rachels, 2015: 51). More precisely, the DCT can be divided into three parts (Rachels, 2015: 51): An action is morally required if and only if God commands us to perform it. It is God's command that makes the action morally required. Such commandments usually exist in the form of religious texts, such as the Bible or the Torah. Claim A concerns positive duties; things we are required to do, but the DCT also applies to negative rights. An action is morally forbidden if and only if God commands us not to perform it. Negative duties are acts that we are morally required not to perform. For example, one of the Ten Commandments is “Thou shalt not kill” (Exodus 20:1-17, King James Version). Since God has commanded us not to kill, according to the DCT, murder is therefore morally forbidden. However, there are many actions that God does not specifically refer to. So there is a third part to the DCT, which deals with actions that God does not mention. An action is morally permissible if and only if God neither commands us to perform it nor commands us not to perform it. A morally permissible act is one that is neither required nor prohibited. It is an act that, morally, you can perform, but without any obligation. These acts are in a sense “morally neutral” (Rachels, 2015; 51). Although this theory canbe attractive, since it would seem, if true, to establish some kind of objective moral standard based on religion, I will show that the DCT claim is false by opposing it for two reasons. The Euthyphro Dilemma First, the Euthyphro Dilemma highlights a profound flaw in the DCT. Essentially, the divine command theorist is presented with two alternatives and must choose one. However, neither alternative is acceptable, due to certain problems, and the divine command theorist is therefore forced to reject DCT entirely. Although its origin dates back to 399 BCE, the Euthyphro Dilemma is considered one of the most important philosophical questions, and is still widely discussed today. Contemporary rapper Jay-Z, in his song “No Church in the Wild,” raps: “Is the godly because God loves the godly? Presented by Plato in a Socratic dialogue between Euthyphro and Socrates, Plato's teacher, Euthyphro's dilemma is essentially a question (Joyce, 2002: 50): do the gods love holiness because it is holy, or is it is she holy because they love her? Socrates, by asking this question, presents Euthyphro with two alternatives, which we can formulate as follows: A certain action is right because God commands it. God commands a certain action because it is right. Although the two statements may seem similar, they are in fact fundamentally different. In claim 1, it is God's command that makes the action morally right. This is also what the DCT says. In contrast, in claim 2, God's command is not what makes the action right. The action is right independently of God, and God also commands that action. In choosing between these two alternatives, the divine command theorist experiences difficulties. If she were to choose the first option, she would be faced with the question of arbitrariness. If the reason a certain action is morally right is because God commands it, then any action could be right, as long as God commands it. In this case, it is God's act of commanding him that makes the action morally right (Berg, 1993: 527). In this way, the first option makes the concepts of good or bad morally completely arbitrary. The arbitrariness becomes particularly evident when we consider the fact that God could always have commanded the opposite (Rachels, 2015: 53). For example, consider the eighth commandment: “Thou shalt not steal” (Exodus 20:1-17, King James Version). According to the DCT, theft is therefore morally wrong. However, God could easily have commanded “thou shalt steal,” and theft would therefore, according to the DCT, be morally right. Since the first option makes the concepts of good and evil morally arbitrary, I would argue that the divine command theorist would be unable to choose the first option. Instead of choosing the first option, the divine command theorist can choose the second and say that God commands us to do certain acts because they are right. Although by choosing the second option the problem of arbitrariness can be avoided, the theological conception of good and evil must also be abandoned (Rachels, 2015: 54). If God commands certain things because they are right, this means that there is an ethical standard independent of religion, to which God subscribes. In this way, the second option essentially subjects God to another independent moral standard (Berg, 1993: 527). For example, God could be a utilitarian; it aims to maximize utility. Then God would command acts aimed at maximizing utility because, according to utilitarianism, these are the morally correct acts. This then challenges the DCT, sincemorality would no longer be based on God (Austin, 2006: 4) but rather on utilitarianism, on which God bases his commandments. Therefore, you can avoid the problems associated with the first option by choosing the second, but if you do this you will also have to abandon the DCT. Euthyphro's dilemma presents a problem for the divine command theorist. Neither option is a legitimate choice. Claim 1 leads to arbitrariness problems, while claim 2 completely deviates from DCT. Both alternatives lead to unacceptable consequences, and it therefore seems that the theologian must abandon DCT altogether. Addressing a Response to Euthyphro's Dilemma: God Loves Us It seems, however, that there may be a way out for the divine command theorist. Adams (1975: 320) presents a response to the Euthyphro dilemma, and more particularly to the assertion that option 1 of the dilemma results in arbitrariness. I will present this objection and attempt to refute it. Adams (1975:320) argues that when considering the dilemma, it is important to make certain assumptions. He believes that we must assume that God's character is loving and that God loves humanity. The first option of the dilemma would then be rephrased as follows: A certain action is right because a loving God commands it. With this reformulation, the question of arbitrariness is no longer present because it would be logically impossible for a loving God to order cruelty, murder, theft, etc., because such acts would contravene God's loving nature. Without the question of arbitrariness, the divine command theorist would be free to choose the first option, thus resolving the dilemma. Although the above response appears to present a solution to the Euthyphro dilemma objection, my response to the response, following Austin's (2006:4), refutes this response. By reformulating option 1 in this way, even if arbitrariness seems to be avoided, the theologian falls victim to the same fate as those who chose option 2. By choosing option 1a, the divine command theorist values ​​certain things independently of God's commandments. A “loving” God simply translates to a God who commands actions that are also independently valued by society. For example, our society values ​​kindness over cruelty, regardless of religion, and so a "loving" God would simply be a God who also values ​​kindness, and therefore commands it. In this way, a person must have a prior, non-theological understanding of ethical right and wrong with which he judges God's commandments as acceptable from a loving God (Adams, 1975: 324). But having a prior, non-theological understanding of ethical right and wrong would mean abandoning DCT altogether. Thus, option 1a still runs into problems if you choose it and the divine command theorist remains unable to resolve the Euthyphro dilemma. What does God command? The Plurality Objection The second objection I will raise against DCT is epistemological. What does God really command? Given the great variety and number of religions in the world, it is impossible to know which religion or God the divine command theorist should follow (Austin, 2006: 10). The accounts of God's commandments in each religion differ greatly and often contradict each other. There are also differences within religions. For example, Catholicism, a Christian faith, supports the idea that contraceptives are morally wrong. Islam's teachings are contrary to Catholic dogma: Muslims believe contraceptives are morally permitted.