A positive effect of marine biodiversity conservation is that in these situations impure public goods prevent exploitation by either party instead of a formal system public regulation or privatization. Seabright points out that the lack of a formal system does not necessarily indicate that the work of conserving marine biodiversity is not really being done: "But of all professions, economists should perhaps be the most sensitive to the fallacy that if government does not run something according to a formal plan, then great inefficiency must occur. Likewise, they should be careful not to assume that moving from a situation of imprecise incentives to one with more formal but still somewhat imprecise incentives will always improve efficiency” (Seabright 133). As the author points out, the field of economics makes us sensitive to the fact that "formal" situations, such as legislated public regulation of public goods, which still retain their "imprecise incentives", will necessarily improve the situation or the efficiency in any area. path. Furthermore, there is the idea of ​​"mutual coercion" in which both parties seek to profit from the trade in impure public goods via the practice of coercion: "For many, the word coercion implies arbitrary decisions by distant bureaucrats and irresponsible; but this is not a necessary part of its meaning. The only type of coercion I recommend is mutual coercion, mutually agreed to by the majority of all concerned” (Hardin 1247). Hardin believes that the capacity for "coercion", in an economic context, is an additional advantage of the impure public goods system that can benefit the regulation of biodiversity in the same way that a purely privatized or public system could do.