When Nussbaum refers to “human capacities,” she is referring to “the capacities of people to do and be certain things deemed valuable” (Nussbaum 275). In other words, a capacity is the ability to choose the way one lives one's life without constraints on any of the available choices. For example, to be able to choose which political party to identify with or to practice the religion of one's choice is to be fully human. According to Nussbaum, being rational and happy is not enough to define humanity. It is being able to make choices that define a truly human life and that are supported with dignity. This begs the question: “What is A really capable of doing and being?” » (Nussbaum 285). Nussbaum introduces a set of three different types of capabilities into his analysis. Basic abilities refer to the inherent capacities for practical reasoning that human beings are born with as infants, but cannot perform their functions until later development (Nussbaum 289). Internal capabilities are those that build on core capabilities through the process of education and other related forms of development (Nussbaum 289). She defines combined capabilities as the combination of internal capabilities and external conditions that make the use of a function possible (Nussbaum 290). This is where public policies should be directed, because the implementation of combined capabilities requires the promotion of internal capabilities as well as the creation of an environment in which the functions can be put into practice. Capabilities can also be seen as a person's actual freedoms or opportunities as a means to accomplish certain functionings. To meet these two requirements, Nussbaum produced a list of "human capabilities" that serve ...... middle of paper ......). Therefore, if rights to liberty and goods and services are violated in various states, how can Nussbaum expect to see central capabilities guaranteed in those states? Another negative aspect of imposing obligations or establishing guarantees on the part of states is that some may not have the power to fulfill these obligations (O'Neill 435). For example, underdeveloped states or states considered failed do not have the economic resources and political stability to do so. Others do not necessarily need to be in a similar situation to avoid meeting their obligations. States considered strong within the international community may encounter problems with law enforcement. Even if they cannot guarantee the right to freedom of their voters, as many authoritarian regimes do. As a result, O'Neill suggests reconsidering whether all second-order obligations should be assigned to states..